We present new evidence on the structure of interbank connections in key markets: derivatives, marketable securities, repo, unsecured lending and secured lending. Taken together, these markets comprise two networks: a network of interbank exposures and a network of interbank funding. Network structure varies across and within these two networks, for reasons related to markets' different economic functions. Credit risk and liquidity risk therefore propagate in the interbank system through different network structures, with implications for financial stability.
Contents
'Focus on the wood, not the trees.' 1 1 Introduction
The interbank system is made up of many interbank markets. In each market, banks transact with each other using a particular financial instrument. To understand the structure of the interbank system, we must analyse not only individual marketsbut also how those markets relate to each other. In doing so, this paper answers the call of Haldane (2009) : to treat the financial system as a system, with connections among its components, and not just a collection of individual markets.
An example makes the point. Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy was not caused by its positions in a single market. Rather, bankruptcy occurred owing to a combination of related events across different markets: Lehman's counterparties supplying short-term funding, through repo and unsecured lending, withdrew; as did non-dealer counterparties to derivatives trades, stripping
Lehman of vital cash from initial margins (Duffie, 2010) . Combined with Lehman's already thin stock of liquid assets, these simultaneous runs across different markets proved fatal. Moreover, these runs were endogenous to each otherit would be unlikely for a run to take place in one market and not another with similar characteristics.
By focusing on, say, the repo market at the beginning of 2008, analysts could have identified Lehman's importance within that market. But only by combining that insight with information on other markets and Lehman's balance sheet could analysts have inferred that Lehman faced risks great enough to cause it fail. Only by analysing banks' activities across interbank markets can we understand the mechanisms of contagion in the system of all interbank markets.
This paper represents an initial attempt to map the structure of interconnectedness across the many different interbank markets that together comprise the interbank system. To do so, we define two types of connectivity: asset interconnectedness (defined as the credit risk of institutions' assets) and liability interconnectedness (the liquidity risk of institutions' liabilities), following the terminology of Scott (2012) . We construct two networks: one based on multiple layers of exposures, by aggregating banks' counterparty credit exposures; and another based on multiple layers of funding, by aggregating banks' cash funding from other banks. We find that these two networks -the 'exposures network' and the 'funding network'have different structures. Structural differences suggest that credit risk and liquidity risk propagate in the interbank system by different contagion processes, as demonstrated in the emerging literature on multi-layered financial networks (Bargigli et al, 2013; Montagna and Kok, 2013) . 2 Our analysis is made possible by a new regulatory dataset, which is the most granular representation of a large interbank system available worldwide. The dataset includes bilateral interbank lending, issuer risk, securities financing transactions, derivatives and other off balance sheet exposures, with further breakdowns by instruments and maturities. It is important to observe these distinct markets, because each market is unique in its economic rationale and design. As a result, different instruments transfer different types and quantities of risk, including credit and liquidity risk.
Many prior studies tend to focus on individual interbank markets in isolation. For example, Furfine (2003) studies overnight unsecured interbank lending ; Brunnermeier et al (2013) focus on contagion risks in the CDS market; and Gorton and Metrick (2012) describe behaviour in the repo market. Such studies reveal important insights about these individual interbank markets.
Nevertheless, by focusing only on individual markets, researchers obtain only a partial view on the interbank system.
Other existing research has focused on aggregate interbank exposures, without distinguishing between exposures generated in different interbank markets. For example, Wells (2004) and Alessandri et al (2009) model contagion processes within the UK interbank system using regulatory large exposures data. These data help to provide an approximation of aggregate bilateral interbank exposures, summed across markets. But the lack of a breakdown by instrument implies that differences and interactions between interbank markets could not be explored in these studies.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the new regulatory dataset. In Section 3, we construct the multi-layered interbank system and infer stylized facts regarding the formation of exposures and the flows of funds within the exposure and funding networks.
Section 4 elaborates on the structural properties of the interbank system, and the ways in which those properties vary across different markets. Section 5 provides economic interpretation of these results. 2 The term "multi-layered" does not imply any hierarchy of layers. Rather, each layer simply represents an individual interbank market.
This terminology is commonly used in the recent literature (see, for example, Montagna and Kok, 2013 ).
Data
This paper is based on a new regulatory dataset on interbank exposures in the UK. By providing a thorough breakdown of interbank exposures by financial instruments, the new dataset represents an important improvement on existing data. This section summarises these improvements, and explains how they are necessary for the subsequent analysis.
The new dataset on interbank markets
UK banks report their exposures to other banks and broker dealers by financial instrument, including:
 lending (unsecured, secured 3 and undrawn);
 holdings of equity and fixed-income securities (marketable securities) issued by banks;
 credit default swaps (CDS) bought and sold 4 ;
 securities lending and borrowing (gross and net of collateral);
 repo and reverse repo (gross and net of collateral); and
 derivatives exposures (with breakdown by type of derivative). 5
Moreover, banks report exposures with breakdown by the maturity of the instrument. 6 Banks'
internal risk management limits with respect to counterparties and instruments are also supplied. A large strand of prior research has used data reported under large exposures regulation (Wells, 2004; Alessandri et al, 2009 (Upper and Worms, 2004; Wells, 2004; Degryse and Nguyen, 2007; Alessandri et al, 2009 ). Using real data, Mistrulli (2011) shows that maximum entropy techniques tend to underestimate the extent of contagion in the case of interbank markets. Observing all interbank exposures directly, as in the new regulatory dataset, is therefore a substantial improvement in accuracy, in addition to granularity. 9 The fact that a minority of (smaller) banks submit a less granular template does not affect most of our analysis, given that all banks report the key elements that comprise the exposures and funding network (defined subsequently). However, certain breakdowns, such as maturity breakdown for marketable securities and derivatives exposures by asset class, are not available for smaller banks. Another set of papers only study interbank short-term loans extracted from payments data, deploying the method proposed by Furfine (1999) . National payments systems have been studied in the UK (Wetherilt, Zimmerman and Soramaki, 2010) . Similar papers have been published using data from the US (Furfine, 2003; Bech and Atalay, 2008) ; Denmark (Bech and Rørdam, 2009 ); Germany (Bräuning and Fecht, 2012) ; Italy (Iori et al, 2008) and Norway (Akram and Christophersen, 2010) . In addition, the 'Furfine methodology' provides highfrequency interbank exposures data with price information, but inference is subject to error.
Using TARGET2 data, Arciero et.al. (2013) find that the Furfine algorithm is relatively reliable, whereas Armantier and Copeland (2012) find significant errors using Fedwire data.
The third typical source of interbank exposures data is centralised credit registers of banks' loan-or borrower-level exposures, which are maintained in many European countries (ECB, 2003) . Some of these national credit registers have been used to observe interbank networks. Iazzetta and Manna (2009) in definition and scope, rather than issues with the quality of our dataset. 11
Constructing the Multi-Layered Interbank System
This section constructs the multi-layered UK interbank system by aggregating over individual financial instruments. We define two principal networksthe exposures network and the funding networkwhich are relevant for systemic credit risk and systemic liquidity risk respectively.
The exposures network and the funding network
Each financial instrument is associated with its own market. We can talk, for example, of the 'repo market' or the 'derivatives market'. By the same logic, each instrument is associated with its own network. The 'repo network' is a set of banks connected to each other through repo contracts. In the new regulatory dataset, we observe banks' exposures to each other broken down by key instruments, each broken down by maturity.
Our interest lies in the type of risk which is transferred, rather than the name of the financial instrument per se. For example, if one is interested in interbank funding, one should look at the notional amount of repo in addition to other forms of funding, such as prime lending. The 'repo network' on its own is not fully informative, because it ignores funding (and associated risks) transferred using other instruments, and it misses the role of collateral within the repo market.
Following Scott (2012) , we focus on the two dimensions of balance sheet interconnectedness:
on the asset side of lending banks (credit risk) and on the liability side of borrowing banks (funding risk). We therefore generate two networks, denoted as the exposures network and funding network: in this way conveys important information about the multiple layers (markets) which comprise the networks. 12 We did not include debt instruments in the funding network, because the exposures reported by banks are net of short positions in those securities and hence may not be equal to the actual amount of funding provided. 13 Debt instruments are not included in the funding network, because exposures reported by banks are net of longs and shorts and so might not be equal to the actual amount of funding provided.
Figure 1: Interbank Exposures Network

Figure 2: Interbank Funding Network
Note for figures 1 and 2: Each node represents a bank. Arrows point away from the exposed bank in the Exposure Network and away from the lending bank in the Funding Network. Circles' diameters are proportional to the logarithm of banks' total interbank exposures in the exposures network and the logarithm of banks' received interbank funding in the funding network. Orange circles represent selected large UK banks, green circles represent investment banks, blue circles represent overseas banks and red circles represent building societies. The widths of arrows are proportional to the value of the exposures and funding amounts.
Composition of the two networks
In this section, we describe the composition of the two networks. Figure 3 shows the composition by instrument of the exposures and funding networks. In terms of exposures (Panel A), derivatives are the most substantial, comprising nearly half of all interbank exposures.
Unsecured loans (25%), marketable securities (16%) and securities financing transactions (11%) make up most of the remainder. The funding network (Panel B) is dominated by repo (66%) and unsecured loans (29%).
Figure 3: Instrument Breakdown of the Exposures and Funding Networks
Note: The percentages are based on the aggregate amount of exposures and funding reported, broken down by instrument.
We can examine the characteristics of the two networks in more detail. Figure 4 shows the maturity breakdown of lending instruments (including repo and interbank lending) and marketable securities (equity and debt securities), two layers of the funding network. The majority of lending instruments (66%) have an outstanding maturity of less than 3 months; only 14% mature in over one year. The share of marketable securities with maturity above one year is somewhat higher, at 33%.
Figure 4: Maturity Breakdown of the Interbank Market
Note: The percentages are based on the aggregate amount of unsecured lending and marketable securities) broken down by maturity. Figure 5 shows the breakdown of derivatives exposures by asset class, including equity, FX, credit, interest rate, commodity and other derivatives. The largest category is interest rate derivatives, followed by FX and credit derivatives, reflecting demand for hedges against latent interest rate, currency and credit risks. Exposures in other derivatives are relatively small.
Figure 5: Derivatives Breakdown by Derivative Type
Note: Percentages based on aggregate value of derivative exposures (net of collateral) broken down by trade types. Figure 6 cuts the exposures and funding networks by bank type. We classify banks as the eight largest UK banks; other UK banks; building societies; foreign investment banks with UK subsidiaries; other overseas banks with UK subsidiaries; and non-reporting foreign banks with no UK subsidiary. As shown in Figure 6 , 62% of exposures are reported by large UK banks, followed by investment banks (22%). In the funding network, 37% of funding is provided to large UK banks, followed by investment banks (30%) and non-reporting banks (21%). The above analysis provides an overview of the composition of the exposures and funding network. However, more detailed analysis on the structure of the networks, as presented below, is needed to understand the interconnectedness and potential contagion channels of the interbank market.
Exposures relative to capital
Building societies reported the highest interbank exposures relative to their total core Tier 1 capital (214%); the figure is 72% for UK commercial banks, 70% for large UK banks, 88% for investment banks and 138% for overseas banks. Globally, large banks are most reliant on interbank markets, with 0.9% of their global liabilities comprising obligations to other UK banks. The corresponding figures are 0.8% for building societies; 0.7% for investment banks; 0.4% for commercial banks; 0.2% for overseas banks; and 0.2% for non-reporting banks.
Analysing the Multi-Layered Interbank System
In the previous section we highlight the characteristics of the exposure network and the funding network from various different angles. Aggregation is in many cases a very useful measure to summarise the nature of a system, if exposures and funding are uniformly distributed across banks. However, as Figure 1 and 2 show, the distribution of exposures and funding is highly skewed; aggregate numbers therefore do not describe the full structure of the interbank market.
In the rest of this section, we disentangle that complexity. In particular, we analyse network structure along three different dimensions. Analysis of network structure provides insights on the economics which define the structure of the networks illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 , as well as the insights on contagion risks in the system (the latter is discussed in Section 5.2).
Network structure by banks' sectors
Bank sectors are defined by banks' general business models and by the historical formation of the banking market: in the UK, sectors are defined as large UK banks; other UK commercial banks; building societies; investment banks; overseas banks; and, due to the nature of our dataset, 'non-reporting' banks, which are not regulated by the Bank of England, but nevertheless entities to which UK-regulated banks are exposed. This categorisation is used by the UK's bank regulator, the Prudential Regulation Authority. Furthermore, we can expect that banks in the same category would have a similar business model and therefore the banks are more likely to fail at the same time, which justifies bundling banks in the same category (Figure 8 and 9 ). In the funding network ( Figure 9 ), large UK banks seem to rely heavily on funding from investment banks, mostly via repos. Other UK commercial banks and building societies are pure lenders in the interbank market. I.e. the funding network has a unilateral from smaller UK banks to large UK banks.
Overall, the UK interbank system is dominated by large UK banks that are very active in the derivatives market. In addition, these large UK banks receive unsecured funding from small banks and building societies, and secured funding from investment banks. Investment banks are net lenders in the funding network, and probably rely on intragroup funding from overseas parents.
Figure 8: Exposures Network by Bank Sector Type
Figure 9: Funding Network by Bank Sector Type
Notes for Figures 8 and 9 : Links below £10bn are not shown in the graph. Arrows point away from the exposed set of banks in the Exposures Network and away from the lending set of banks in the Funding Network. The sizes of the circles in Figure 8 and 9 are proportional to the total core Tier 1 capital of banks in each sector type, and the total assets of banks in each sector type, respectively. Figure 10 illustrates the dominance of large UK banks in the interbank system. The scatterplot shows out-degree in the exposures network (the number of banks a given bank is exposed to) against in-degree in the funding network (the number of banks providing funding to a given bank). The area of the markers is proportional to the log of banks' total group-level liabilities.
Most large banks are exposed to 20 or more counterparties (except non-reporting banks and a However, the picture changes substantially when we account for the values (or weights) of links among banks. We define out (in) strength as the sum of the pound-sterling value of links from 15 As mentioned in footnote 7, banks may report up to six UK counterparties in addition to the top 20. Again, four UK banks stand out as the largest players in the interbank market, together taking 41% of market share in the exposures network and 33% of market share in the funding network ( Figure 11 ). But some additional insights emerge from this weighted approach which were obscured by simple un-weighted degree (Figure 10 ). Beyond the large UK banks, approximately six investment banks play a significant role in both the exposures and funding markets.
Network structure by banks' roles in the interbank system
We looked at the network of exposures between sectors in the previous section. Those intersector networks assume that the fortunes of banks within a sector are correlated, by virtue of similar business models. But banks with similar business models do not necessarily play the same roles within the interbank system. Some banks might specialise in providing unsecured loans; others would act as market makers in derivative markets. The sectoral categorisation we have seen above does not necessarily reflect how banks behave in the interbank system: in other words, how banks specialise.
In this section, we categorise banks by their exposures in each market in order to identify groups with common concentrations to distinct market instruments. These market instruments include unsecured loans, secured loans, market products, derivative and others. We categorise banks by their activity in the interbank market using cluster analysis, which helps us to infer groupings (clusters) from multivariate data: a cluster of banks identified is exposed only to unsecured lending, which can be characterised as a cluster specialising in the supply of unsecured loans.
Cluster analysis has been used in other fields of finance. Ang and Longstaff (2011) , for example, use the method to identify asset price co-movement.
Cluster analysis works as follows. Suppose that we categorise people jointly by height and weight. To do this, we calculate distance between people across the two dimensions of height and weight. The definition of distance is illustrated by d 1 and d 2 in the left-hand panel of Figure   12 . Based on this distance, we bundle nearest people to create a cluster. In the next step, we calculate distance between these small clusters; the closest clusters are again bundled into a larger cluster. This process continues until all people are merged into one big cluster.
The sequential process of bundling creates a hierarchical structure of clusters of different sizes.
The dendrogram on the right of Figure 12 clarifies the hierarchy. The vertical axis is the 'threshold of distance' between clusters. For example, a cluster of two people who are 'tall and heavy' is separated from another cluster of 'middle height and heavy' people by d 2 . Further up the hierarchy, these 'tall and heavy' and 'middle height and heavy' people form a single cluster, which is separated from the 'short and light' cluster by d 1 . Thus, the distance d quantifies the difference between clusters. The dendrogram therefore provides different categorisations for different sizes of clusters.
Figure 12: Overview of Cluster Analysis and Dendrogram
We identify clusters of reporting banks based on the instrument breakdown of their interbank exposures. For each of the 176 reporting banks, we calculate their proportions (relative to each bank's total interbank exposure) of holdings of unsecured loans, secured loans, marketable securities, net CDS sold, securities financing transactions (SFTs) and derivatives. These six instruments create six dimensions of banks' characteristics. In this set-up, two banks with concentrations of exposures in unsecured interbank lending have low relative distance and therefore tend to be assigned to the same cluster early in the sequential process. In contrast, if one bank primarily holds unsecured loans and another mostly bonds and derivatives, those two banks have different business models. This difference is elicited by cluster analysis. The resulting dendrogram for the interbank exposures network is shown in Figure 13 . Categorising banks by their concentration of exposures leads to significantly different groupings than those obtained from a sectoral breakdown. Table 2 shows the six major clusters identified and the composition of clusters' exposures. 16 Overall, we find that banks can be usefully divided into six clusters: unsecured lenders; secured lenders; marketable securities holders; derivative houses; SFT specialists; and banks with no interbank exposures. In addition, the cluster of marketable securities holders can be divided into two sub-clusters depending on the degree of their concentrations in unsecured lending. 17 The cluster of derivative houses can be also divided into two sub-groups depending on their diversification of exposures across instruments other than derivatives. Note: The numbers in each row show the percentage breakdown of the total exposures of entities in the specific cluster / sub-cluster in terms of different types of instruments. Banks without any interbank exposures are omitted. 16 The major clusters are identified by setting a threshold of distance between sub-clusters. Since this analysis first identifies small clusters close to each other, the distance between them becomes longer as the algorithm identifies larger clusters. Once the distance between clusters exceeds a threshold, those clusters are defined as major clusters. The threshold is set to be 50% of the longest distance. 17 Note that the division is done again by cluster analysis. Figure 13 shows the red cluster which represents the marketable securities holders has two sub-clusters within it. one which has most interbank exposures in derivatives (minimal clusters 2, 6, 11, 15, 18) , denoted as 'pure derivative houses', and the other which has relatively diversified exposures in unsecured lending, marketable securities and SFTs, in addition to derivatives (5, 14, 17, 22, 23, 25) , denoted as 'diversified banks'. Around half of large UK banks are in the former category, with heavily concentrated exposure in derivatives.
The latter more balanced category consists of most investment banks and a small number of large UK banks.
 Securities financing transactions (SFT) specialists cluster. This is a small group of SFT specialists concentrating to repo and securities lending transactions.
 There are around 20 reporting banks with no interbank exposures, which are not categorised in any of the clusters above.
Overall, each smaller bank tends to concentrate their interbank activity in a particular instrument. This could be because each one of the diversified activities needs a large fixed cost and thus exhibits scale economies (i.e. operating many small activities would be too costly compared with the benefit of the diversification). Large banks are in a relatively better position to diversify activities, but some large banks concentrate their interbank exposures in derivative contracts, and therefore can be categorised as 'pure derivative houses', reflecting their sizable investment banking operations as derivative dealers, alongside some investment banks. On the other hand, some large investment banks operating in the UK have a more evenly distributed spectrum of activity in the interbank market. This implies that the taxonomy 'large UK banks'
and 'investment banks' (Figures 8 and 9) does not necessarily reflect the nature of banks' roles in the UK interbank system. 
Figure 14: Network of Inter-Cluster Exposures
Note: small links (less than 2% of total exposures) are not shown. The sizes of the circles are proportional to the total size of banks' core Tier 1 capital in each cluster. Arrows point away from the exposed set of banks. The clusters of secured lenders and SFT specialists are merged in Figure 14 and 15 since the natures of their business are similar.
Figure 15: Network of Inter-Cluster Funding
Note: small links (less than 2% of total funding) are not shown. The sizes of the circles are proportional to the total size of bank assets in each cluster. Arrows point away from the lending set of banks.
Pure derivatives houses are at the core of the exposure network. This cluster comprises a group of dealers with significant exposures to securities holders, diversified banks, and other banks in their own cluster, mostly in the form of derivatives. They are exposed to securities holders most likely because they provide these banks derivatives to hedge risks on holding the securities, while they have exposures in both directions with more diversified banks partly because many banks in the two clusters are involved in market making activities.
The two sub-clusters containing derivative counterparties have different funding structures. The pure derivative houses are net borrowers in the system and borrowing from all the other clusters.
Diversified banks, on the other hand, are net lenders: banks in this cluster are mostly foreign investment banks which rely on wholesale funding from other countries and intra-group funding from their parents. The diversified banks also provide a significant quantity of secured funding to pure derivative houses. If the UK were to experience a liquidity shortage triggered in foreign countries, it would be this cluster that would transmit the shock, which would then propagate to all clusters since the diversified banks provide liquidity to all clusters. Given this international connection, the diversified banks comprise a key cluster in the UK funding network. Including the cluster of marketable securities holders that engages in intensive mutual financing with the diversified banks and the pure derivative houses; these three clusters are central in the UK funding market.
The inter-cluster networks provide several insights that could not be observed in inter-sector networks. Since each cluster is highly specialised in one instrument (except for the diversified banks), we can capture the diversification of roles in the interbank system. This permits us to consider the nature of potential risks arising from a stress in a specific cluster: for instance, it is immediate from Figure 15 that a stress on small (commercial) banks could result in a significant decline of unsecured lending, which hits the pure derivative houses most.
The inter-cluster networks helps to identify the roles banks play in the system, and thereby visualise the multi-layered structure of connections among banks in the UK. Figure 3 shows that derivative exposures represent the largest proportion of exposures. But this observation must be combined with the insight that derivatives are typically traded by larger banks. Figure 14 uncovers this centrality of derivatives houses within the interbank system, compared with the simple inter-sector network shown in Figure 8 .
Furthermore, cluster analysis highlights the risk arising from unsecured lending in the UK. The interbank exposure of unsecured lenders is small relative to the total exposures in the system, but unsecured lenders' ratio of interbank exposures to their own capital is higher compared with other clusters. Unsecured lenders' relative vulnerability to the failure of a bank to which they have an exposure could cause contagion within the funding network, through the squeeze of unsecured lending, with important ramifications for other banks especially the pure derivative houses. In particular, the cluster of unsecured lenders is a disproportionately important source of funding in the UK: the unsecured lenders are the second largest net lender in the UK interbank system (as the largest cluster, diversified banks, are dominated by foreign banks, this unsecured lender cluster is the largest domestic funding source). Data behind Figure 15 show that one sixth of derivative houses' external funding comes from unsecured lenders.
The inter-cluster funding network (Figure 15 ) provides information the inter-sector network ( Figure 9 ) does not. Figure 9 highlights the major UK banks' reliance on investment banks only, but Figure 15 shows that derivative houses rely on funding from all clusters (whereas most investment banks are classified as derivative houses, diversified banks or SFT specialists).
Core-periphery structure by financial instrument
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 established that the UK interbank market is highly concentrated. Most banks have small exposures to other banks: the average bilateral exposure in the exposures network is £119 million. But some banks have large exposures to other banks. The distribution of strength in the exposures network is therefore right-tailed, with positive skewness of 5.8. We will test if the UK interbank system follows a specific concentrated structure, as described below.
Intuitively, then, the concentrated UK interbank system appears to mimic a so-called 'hub and spoke' or 'core-periphery' structure. Figures 1 and 2 convey this impression graphically.
Informally, the core consists of a set of banks that are strongly connected to other banks in the core and possibly also to banks on the periphery; in contrast, the periphery consists of banks that are only connected to the core banks but not to other peripheral banks. This topology has pedigree in the existing networks literature. In Borgatti and Everett (1999) , the core-periphery structure is exemplified by a core perfectly connected to itself: in matrix terminology, a block of ones. In contrast, the periphery is perfectly disconnected from itself: periphery-to-periphery elements form a block of zeroes. These stylised features are summarised in Table 3 . In this formulation of the stylised core-periphery matrix, we are agnostic with respect to linkages between the core and periphery. Elements in the core-periphery and periphery-core blocks can take any value in this stylised core-periphery structure. In financial networks, it is not clear a priori how the core should connect with the periphery in the stylised core-periphery structure;
hence our agnosticism. But Craig and von Peter (2014) argue that a core bank should lend to at least one and borrow from at least one peripheral bank. Their intuition is that core banks should play an intermediation role not limited to their activity within the core block. In practice, this additional constraint never binds in our data. On the contrary, core banks play a strong intermediation role between peripheral banks. Defining the stylised core-periphery structure allows us to test how closely the UK interbank network approximates such a structure. Formal testing facilitates greater precision than may be achieved from general inferences regarding strength distributions and market concentration. Borgatti and Everett (1999) quantify the degree of fitness of the core-periphery model to the observed interbank network, using a Pearson correlation between the stylised matrix X (Table 3 adapted to the dimensions of our data) and the observed matrix of interbank exposures E. This approach has the virtue of simplicity and transparency. Moreover, Pearson correlation accounts for the values of links by construction. This is because although the stylised core-periphery matrix of Table 2 remains un-weightedelements are either zero, one or blankthe Pearson correlation tests the extent to which the mean of elements in the core block is significantly greater than the mean of elements in the periphery block, relative to within-block variance. The Pearson correlation coefficient, r, is given by:
where denotes the elements in the stylised core-periphery matrix X and denotes the elements in the observed matrix of exposures E (i.e. adjacency matrix). Variables with an upper bar denote sample means. r=1 if E and X are perfectly correlated, and r=0 if uncorrelated.
The first step is to define the composition of the core and periphery blocks. We exploit a genetic algorithm developed by Borgatti, Everett and Freeman (2002) . The algorithm searches for a composition of core and peripheral banks to maximise . The resulting categorisation of the core and periphery is optimal, in the sense that it is the categorisation which for that observed matrix approximates most closely the stylised core-periphery structure.
We apply the algorithm to the exposures network for a square 176x176 matrix comprised of the reporting banks only. That is, we drop exposures from reporting banks to non-reporting banks.
For this network, the algorithm finds the optimal core comprised of seven banks; the remaining 169 banks therefore comprise the periphery. Fitness between the exposures network and the stylised core-periphery structure is 0.672, suggesting significant fitness. In contrast, the funding network comprises an optimal core of nine banks and exhibits fitness of 0.385 with respect to the stylised core-periphery structure. See Section 5.1 for an interpretation of the heterogeneous fitness levels.
We can investigate core-periphery fitness in more detail by implementing the algorithm on networks by the major financial instrument categories: derivatives, marketable securities, SFTs (including repos), unsecured lending and secured lending. 18 The results indicate that the 18 Note that unsecured and secured lending appear in both panels A and B, since they are components of both the exposure and funding networks. The two instruments' fitness and the number of core banks are the same in panel A and B since they are measured on gross of closeness of the observed unsecured lending and repo networks to the stylised core-periphery structure is relatively low, with fitness of 0.415 and 0.362 respectively. Given that repo is 66% of the total funding network (Figure 3 ), fitness of 0.362 drives relatively low fitness of 0.385 in the overall funding network. In contrast, fitness in the derivatives and marketable securities networks (blue dots), which comprise part of the overall exposures network, is relatively high, at 0.577 and 0.639 respectively. 19 Another interesting facet of these instrument-specific results is how the composition of the core changes by instrument. Figure 16 shows core-periphery results based on eight different networks: total exposures, which is the sum of derivatives, marketable securities, securities financing transactions, secured lending (gross) and unsecured lending (gross); and total funding, which is the sum of secured lending, unsecured lending and repo (gross).
Figure 16 -Weighted Fitness of Core-Periphery Model by Instrument
In total, 20 banks comprise part of the core in at least one network. But many of these banks are core banks in more than one network, such that the number of core-banks sums to 50 across the eight networks. Figure 17 shows that one bank comprises part of the core in six of the eight networks considered here. Eleven other banks comprise part of the core in at least two subcollateral basis in both the exposure and funding network. Repo is a subset of SFT and implicitly appears both panels, but panel A calculate repos on net of collateral basis, while panel B measures on a gross basis. 19 Secured lending also shows high fitness. However, this has a small weight in the total funding network since secured lending is very small compared with unsecured lending and repo. networks. All of these core banks are either large UK banks or investment banks. Finally, eight banks appear in the core only once: these banks may be thought of as product-specialists, which are significant from a systemic perspective only in one particular market.
Figure 17 -Composition of the Core by Bank Type (Weighted Fitness)
Some subtleties of these results are sensitive to the definition of fitness. For robustness, we implement an alternative approach suggested by Craig and von Peter (2014) . Their measure of fitness is a simple count of the number of elements in the observed matrix which are not equal to the respective element in the stylised core-periphery matrix. This approach therefore ignores the values of links, which is captured by the Pearson approach suggested by Borgatti and Everett (1999) .
We run the algorithm again, using Craig and von Peter's 'error count' approach. Several differences are worth highlighting. First, the 'error count' approach suggests that the secured lending network approximates a core-periphery structure much more strongly than any other network ( Figure 18 ). In contrast, the Pearson correlation approach found that fitness in the secured lending network was similar to fitness in the derivatives and marketable securities networks ( Figure 16) . Second, the 'error count' approach defines the optimal core to be larger than that found using the Pearson correlation approach in every network except that of securities financing transactions. Third, in terms of 'product specialists', the 'error count' approach defines four building societies and one overseas bank as part of the core in one or two networks, whereas the Pearson correlation approach identified no building society and five overseas banks as part of the core in one network. In the latter case, building societies might have many links with other core banks, but these links are relatively small in value: hence they are excluded from the core in the Pearson approach, but included in the 'error count' approach. Notably, both the Borgatti and Everett (1999) and the 'error count' approach identify similar banks which comprise the core in at least three networks. The Pearson approach finds that six UK banks and three investment banks comprise the core in at least three networks, while the 'error count' approach identifies six UK banks and six investment banks. Despite some important differences between the Pearson and 'error count' approaches, the central finding with respect to the 'most core' banks is robust to the definition of fitness. 
Interpretation
We have observed that the UK interbank system clearly exhibits a core-periphery structure. In this section, we draw on the existing banking and networks literature to explain why such a network structure might emerge from interbank transactions, and to infer implications for the stability of the financial system as a whole.
5.1
The mechanisms behind the core-periphery structure Several papers have identified the core-periphery structure in other European interbank systems:
Craig and von Peter (2014), Fricke and Lux (2012) and van Lelyveld and Veld (2012) . But there is little theory to help understand why interbank systems tend to adopt a core-periphery structure. Degryse and Nguyen (2007) show that the integration of European banking systems after the introduction of the euro established the core-periphery structure of Belgian interbank system in the late 1990s. They argue that Belgian banks had more cross-border transactions after the introduction of the euro, and only large banks with a good international reputation could act as correspondents for smaller banks that could not overcome the problem of asymmetric information (Freixas and Holthausen, 2005) .
Degryse and Nguyen's observation that larger banks act as intermediaries in cross-border
transactions is consistent with our finding. We identify 20 core banks in various markets, mostly comprising large UK banks and investment banks (see Figure 17 ). As Figure 8 shows, these banks' largest exposures are to foreign non-reporting banks. At the same time, smaller domestic banks (commercial banks and building societies) are predominantly exposed to large UK banks.
This implies that large UK banks act as intermediaries in cross-border transactions. Figure 17 also shows that five overseas banks comprise part of the core in one market: analogously to the large UK banks, these overseas banks act as portals for their domestic banks to tap international markets. This insight implies that the core banks identified in the UK interbank market are also likely to be core banks in global markets.
Another network formation theory supported by our finding is provided by Duffie, Gârleanu and Pederson, (2005) . Their argumentthat market-makers reduce search costs, balancing demand and supply between (unsophisticated) market participantscould help to explain why we identify core-periphery structure in each financial market we test. In many financial markets, a few traders quote both bids and offers; other less active traders deal with them at the quoted prices, and do not trade with banks which are not market-makers. This naturally creates a concentrated exposure network, depicted by Figure 10 .
However, these theories do not explain our other key finding: that core-periphery fitness varies substantially by instrument, especially between exposure and funding networks (Section 4.3). This is partly because the theories consider star-shaped networks with a single core bank, while our core-periphery networks allow for multiple core banks.
One descriptive explanation for the relatively low core-periphery fitness observed in the funding network is that this network exhibits a lower degree of connectedness between core banks. In the unsecured lending and repo markets, the big players are not strongly connected to each other. Instead, core banks tend to absorb funding from peripheral banks ( Figure 15 ). In other words, core banks are net borrowers in the funding networkin part because all market-makers have a latent demand for liquidity, which must therefore be provided by non-market-makers.
This asymmetric distribution of funding scarcity across banks endogenously generates a network structure which approximates several sub-networks, with an individual bank at the core of each sub-network. The links across these sub-networks are sparse; hence the funding network exhibits low core-to-core fitness. This feature of the funding network can be observed in Figure   2 , compared with Figure 1.
Network structure and financial stability
Although the core-periphery structure has been observed in several interbank systems, the existing literature is not conclusive on whether the network structure is robust or vulnerable to systemic risk. Allen and Gale (2000) show the risk of contagion increases in incomplete networks; in contrast, Battiston et al (2012) argue that a highly connected network could amplify the effect of an initial negative shock. In this vein, Gai and Kapadia (2010) find that while the probability of contagion is decreasing in connectivity, the impact of contagion should it occur is increasing in connectivity. Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) show how core banks can act as 'fire stops' in the case of peripheral banks' defaults. The robustness of core banks arises from their opportunity to diversify counterparty credit risk, since the core bank is connected to many other banks. Core banks indeed have many connections with peripheral banks in our dataset. The average indegree of cores from peripherals in the exposures network is 89, and the average out-degree of cores to peripherals is 22.
However, Nier et al (2007) argue that the connectivity between core and peripheral banks is not monotonic. If a core bank is connected to few peripherals then the default of that core bank is likely to trigger peripheral banks' default. But if a core bank is connected with many peripheral banks, the insolvency shock is diluted and therefore less likely to create a systemic problem. The theoretic result follows from simulations which assume homogeneous banks. But our paper has shown that banks are highly heterogeneous in terms of both balance-sheet characteristics and levels and types of activities in the interbank markets.
It is therefore important to interact balance-sheet characteristics with interbank market activity in a way that captures banks' heterogeneity. To do this, we extend a metric suggested by Amini, Cont and Minca (2014) , Contagious Link, to incorporate peripherals banks' heterogeneity. The metric defines vulnerable links as those where the exposed counterparties becomes insolvent when a bank becomes insolvent. In the first instance, we assume that the exposed counterparties become insolvent when their exposure is larger than their core Tier 1 capitalimplicitly assuming a loss given default of 100%.
To identify contagious links, we examine the impact on counterparties' capital given the default of each single bank. In our dataset, there are 98 such contagious links. We find that 50% of these links are exposures of peripheral banks to core banks (i.e. a core bank's default triggers multiple defaults by peripheral banks); 30% are exposures of peripherals to non-reporting banks; and the remaining 20% are exposures between peripheral banks. If we define contagious links as exposures larger than 50% of the exposed bank's capital, the number of contagious links increases to 270although the aforementioned breakdown (50%-30%-20%) remains the same.
All of the banks which are exposed to these contagious links are peripheral banks, suggesting that these banks are less diversified with respect to their counterparty credit risk.
Since the isolated default of certain core banks causes multiple peripheral banks to default, it is natural to consider that further (second-and subsequent-round) effects could be systemic. To assess the risk of domino effects, we calculate possible higher-round effects arising through contagious links, by checking if any bank loses (50% of) its capital as a result of the multiple defaults. If any bank becomes insolvent, we repeat the process to investigate whether the additional defaults trigger further defaults. In our dataset, the potential for these higher-round effects appears relatively contained. Including higher-round effects increases the number of contagious links to just 99 (from 98) when defined as exposures greater than 100% of exposed banks' capital; and to 295 (from 270) using a 50% threshold.
This relatively small increase in the number of contagious links including higher-round effects arises because the exposed banks are mainly peripheral banks, which are connected to core banks. These core banks tend to be better diversified with respect to their bank-counterparty credit risk. Thus the central expectation is that higher-round effects are safely absorbed by better-diversified core banks.
This insight illustrates the resilience of a core-periphery network in which core banks act as firestops against default contagion (Freixas et al, 2000) . However, the strength of the fire-stop depends on the quality of core banks' diversification of bank-counterparty risk and the relative quantity of core banks' loss-absorbing capital. Moreover, since core banks are connected to many peripheral (and other core) banks, their defaultif it occurredcould cause widespread losses. Core-periphery network structures therefore possess a 'robust-yet-fragile' property, which is common to many financial networks (Gai and Kapadia, 2010) . In principle, this finding supports the application of capital surcharges on systemically important banks to build the resilience of these fire-stops in the core of the network.
Conclusion
This paper describes the features of the UK interbank system, using a new regulatory dataset on interbank exposures. To our knowledge, this dataset is the most granular representation of a large interbank market available worldwide. The dataset allows us to analyse the structure of the interbank system by asset class. We find that the network of interbank exposures has a different structure of connections from the network of interbank funding. This distinction between 'exposure' and 'funding' networks is important to fully understand contagion processes.
In addition, we divide banks into different clusters according to the financial instruments in which their interbank activity is concentrated. Our analysis shows that banks play different roles: large derivative houses, dominant in the system, absorb funding from all other clusters, particularly from non-UK investment banks (using repo contracts) and UK smaller banks (using unsecured loans). This highlights a potential systemic risk, whereby a reduction in funding provided by foreign investment banks, or by UK commercial banks with less capital and less risk diversification (see Section 5.2), could trigger widespread liquidity shortages.
Finally, we calculate the closeness of interbank networks to a hypothetical core-periphery structure. The networks clearly exhibit such a structure, but the strength of this approximation varies by asset class. For example, the network of interbank exposures is much closer to a core-periphery structure than the network of interbank funding. Also, many banks are in the core of certain markets but not others. A core-periphery structure has ambiguous implications for financial stability: such a structure is robust to 'random shocks' (such as defaults by peripheral banks) but vulnerable to 'targeted attacks' (such as a default by a core bank).
